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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ICC SECURITY AUTHORIZATIONS:
THE RELEVANCE OF UNAPPROVED CONTROL*
SECTION 20a of the Interstate Commerce Act empowers the ICC to au-
thorize stock issues considered compatible with the public interest.' While
the statutory standards reflect a predominant congressional intent that the
Commission judge a financing's effect on the service offered by the carrier,2
courts have recognized a co-ordinate duty to protect investors.3 Since the
Commission must thus discharge a dual obligation, factors inappropriate in
agency proceedings designed primarily to safeguard investors are germane to
*Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 26 U.S.L. WEEK 41,16 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1958).
1. 41 STAT. 494 (1920), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 20a (1952). The Commission may
authorize a carrier stock issue under § 20a if it finds that such issue "is for some lawful
object within its corporate purposes, and compatible with the public interest, which is
necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance by the carrier of
service to the public as a common carrier, and which will not impair its ability to per-
form that service, and . . . is reasonably necessary and appropriate for such purpose."
Section 20a and all other sections of the Interstate Commerce Act are to be administered
in a manner best implementing the national transportation policy: ". . . to provide for
fair and impartial regulation of all modes of transportation subject to the provisions of
this Act, so administered as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of each;
to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service and foster sound economic
conditions in transportation among the several carriers . . . ." 54 STAT. 899 (1940), 49
U.S.C. National Transportation Policy (1952); see ICC v. Parker, 326 U.S. 60, 66
(1945).
2. See Statement of Commissioner Clark, 1. Hearings Before the House Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 98-99 (1919) : "Under this
bill the carrier asking for the approval of an issue of either bonds or stocks would state
the purpose for which it desired the money, and the commission would have the power
to approve or disapprove the issue.... Rep. Parker: I am entirely in accord with your
controlling the issues of stocks and other obligations, but the theory, of course, upon
which you are granted that power over the issues of stock and other obligations is whether
or not the purpose stated is a legitimate one within the powers of the carrier. Comm.
Clark: And one which is needed in the proper performance of its public service, and one
that will contribute to the better service and convenience of commerce." See also H.R.
REP. No. 681, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); 3-A SHARFMAN, THE INTESTATE CommRCE
CommiXSSiON 504 (1935): "It is clear that the financial organization of the carriers was
placed under the close supervision of the Commission, and with but scant recognition of
the principles and policies to be applied in the exercise of its regulatory power." Further,
the statutory authorization of § 20a gave the courts and Commission little idea of how
major a reform of carrier finance was intended. 3-A id. at 623.
3. See, e.g., Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905, 910 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
where the court commented on the ICC's recognition that different standards were appli-
cable in its determinations, depending on whether the interest of the public or of the
private stockholder was involved: "There may, indeed, be a real difference between what
is required in the public interest and what is necessary to satisfy stockholders . . . ." Cf.
Cleveland, C., C. & St. L. Ry. v. Jackson, 22 F.2d 509, 511 (6th Cir. 1927) (Commerce
Act "requires that the interest of the stockholder be considered and protected") ; Schwa-
bacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182 (1948) (merger terms must be just and reasonable
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the disposition of a carrier's application for stock authorization.4 The diffi-
culties of resolving authorization requests are increased when courts hold
to all groups of stockholders). For examination of the limited standing afforded share-
holders to contest ICC orders, see notes 28, 45 infra.
Prior to the enactment of § 20a, the Commission had recognized the need for investor
protection in carrier securities. See Consolidations and Combinations of Carriers, 12
I.C.C. 277, 306 (1907) (carrier securities should be safe and conservative investments) ;
New England Investigation, 27 I.C.C. 560, 616 (1913) (securities of one carrier acquired
by another should be a safe investment) ; Eastern Advanced Rate Case, 20 I.C.C. 243,
259-60 (1911) (ICC, in rate case, to take into account possible effect of rate setting on
long-standing good-faith investments). Subsequently, the particular interests of investors
received closer attention. See, e.g., Tenn. Cent. Ry., 105 I.C.C. 609 (1926) (refusal to
authorize issuance of preferred stock with only contingent voting power) ; Pittsburgh &
W. Va. Ry., 105 I.C.C. 552 (1926) (same); Roscoe, Snyder & Pac. Ry., 175 I.C.C. 602,
603 (1.931) (provision that conversion rights of preferred stock governed by board of
directors should be made clear to shareholders) ; Associated Transp., Inc., 38 M.C.C. 137
(1942) (ICC approval of particular method of selling stock required to protect the invest-
ing public unfamiliar with motor carrier securities); Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 254 I.C.C.
653, 657 (1943) (value of property supporting stockholders' equity examined) ; cf. West-
ern Md. Ry., 290 I.C.C. 445, 462 (1954) (ICC required to protect the interests of each
class of shareholders in securities modification plan). Nevertheless, the safeguards afforded
investors by § 20a are indirect. The Commission's authority over carrier financial struc-
ture and practices was "designed, indirectly, to protect the investing public against the
dissipation of railroad resources through faulty or dishonest financing . . . ." 1 SHARF-
MAN, TIIE INTERSTATE COMMERCE COMIMISSION 190 (1931). See also Loss, SEcuRTnES
REGULATION 67 (1951).
4. For factors considered by the ICC, see, e.g., Kansas City So. Ry., 271 I.C.C. 403,
413 (1948) (public interest concerned with compensation paid to financial advisors in
issue and sale of railroad securities) ; Alexander R.R., 267 I.C.C. 421, 422 (1947) (pro-
posed issue with par value of $1 a share not compatible with the public interest) ; New
York, N.H. & H.R.R., 220 I.C.C. 505, 615 (1937) (authorization denied issue designed
for the purpose of acquiring property not to be used in the operations of a railroad);
Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 180 I.C.C. 699, 700 (1932) (conservation of carrier credit is a
matter of public interest) ; Lehigh Valley R.R., 180 I.C.C. 46, 47 (1931) (pledge of bonds
under continuing loan agreements with banking companies not in the public interest). See
also Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (ICC may reject offerings as
improvident, if issue would reduce ability of carrier to render public service).
The Securities Act of 1933, 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1952), was designed to inform the investor of the facts concerning securities offered for
sale and to protect him against fraud and misrepresentation. See S. REP. No. 47, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). See also DAvis, ADMINIsTRATivW LAW 150 (1951); Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 120-26 (1951) ; Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of
1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171 (1933). The Investment Company Act of 1940, 54 STAT. 789
(1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1952), more regulatory in nature than
the Securities Act of 1933, was designed to provide an atmosphere conducive to manage-
ment in the best interests of shareholders. But the Securities and Exchange Commission has
no wide discretionary power under the Investment Company Act like that of the ICC
to approve or prohibit stock issuances. See Motley, Jackson & Barnard, Federal Rcgu-
lation of Investment Companies Since 1940, 63 HARv. L. REV. 1134 (1950) ; Jaretzki, The
Investment Company Act of 1940, 26 WASH. U.L.Q. 303 (1941). The Public Utility
Holding Company Act, in contrast to the Securities Act, looks to the avoidance of injury
to consumers as well as to investors. Public Utility Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 803 (1935),
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that protection of the consuming public or investors requires correct deter-
mination of questions of law collateral to such proceedings."
The protracted litigation between Alleghany Corporation and Breswick &
Co. exemplifies these difficulties.6 Alleghany, an investment company, acquired
control of the New York Central Railway System through a proxy contest
in 1954 without securing ICC approval.1 When the Central system later
as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79-79z (1952) ; see S. REP. No. 621, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 28
(1935). State blue sky laws are designed to protect the public investor. BALLANTINE,
CORPORATIONS 860 (rev. ed. 1946). For a survey of state laws, see Loss & Cowr, BLUE
SKY LAWS (1958) ; BALLANTINE, op. cit. supra at 858-73.
5. The Commission has found it an imposing task to reconcile local interests and
effectuation of the broad aims of the national transportation policy. See 2 SHARFMAN,
THE INTERSTATE COMIIMERCE COMMatISSION 247-58 (1931). See, generally, LoCKLIN, REGU-
LATION OF SECURITY ISSUES BY THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoMMISSION (1925); cf.
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944) (Congress left the ICC free
to resolve the complex considerations involved in carrier consolidations); MOORE, RE-
ORGANIZATION OF RAILROAD CORPORATIONS 157-59 (1941). See also HERRING, PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 183 (1936) : "The milieu is distinctly one
of special interests, and the regulatory body lives in an environment of conflicts. It must
function here, not in accordance with thin, vague concepts, but in terms of concrete
situations where the real content of the public interest must be extricated from a maze
of technical detail."
6. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 138 F.
Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), rev'd and remanded mb. nom. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick
& Co., 353 U.S. 151, on remnd sub. nom. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp.
227 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), rev'd per curiam and remanded sub. nom. Alleghany Corp. v.
Breswick & Co., 26 U.S.L. WEK 4116 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1958).
7. Organized in 1929 with a charter providing for extensive investment powers,
Alleghany registered in 1940 with the SEC as an investment company, under § 80a-3 (a)
of the Investment Company Act. 54 STAT. 797 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1952).
However, in 1945, after acquiring control of more than one rail carrier, it became subject
to the jurisdiction of the ICC. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 261 I.C.C. 239 (1945). The SEC
therefore relinquished its jurisdiction. Alleghany Corp., 20 S.E.C. 731 (1945). In 1954,
after divesting itself of all carrier control, Alleghany conducted a successful proxy fight
for control of the New York Central Railway System. See N.Y. Times, June 12, 1954,
p. 27, cols. 5-8. The incumbent Central management sought, without success, an ICC
declaratory ruling that control of Central by Alleghany would violate § 5(2) of the In-
terstate Commerce Act. I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 31535, May 18, 1954; see Louisville & J.
Bridge & R.R., 290 I.C.C. 725, 730-31 (1955). Section 5(2) provides: "It shall be law-
ful, with the approval and authorization of the Commission, as provided in subdivision
(b)-(i) for two or more carriers to consolidate or merge their properties or franchises,
or any part thereof, into one corporation for the ownership, management, and operation
of the properties theretofore in separate ownership; or for any carrier, or two or more
carriers jointly, to purchase, lease, or contract to operate the properties, or any part
thereof, of another; or for any carrier, or two or more carriers jointly, to acquire con-
trol of another through ownership of its stock or otherwise; or for a person which is not
a carrier to acquire control of two or more carriers through ownership of their stock or
otherwise; or for a person which is not a carrier and which has control of one or more
carriers to acquire control of another carrier through ownership of its stock or other-
wise . . . ." 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2) (a) (1952). Section
5(2) (b) prohibits the Commission from entering an order approving a proposed trans-
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obtained control of another carrier,8 Alleghany successfully sought carrier
status under section 5(3), which permits the ICC to subject investment and
holding companies controlling carriers to section 20a's security requirements. 9
Pursuant to the authority so established, the Commission authorized an Alle-
ghany stock issue. Subsequently, a three-judge district court enjoined the
issue on the ground that the ICC status order was invalid and that the
action within the scope of § 5(2) (a) "unless it finds that the transaction proposed will
be consistent with the public interest." 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C.
§ 5(2) (b) (1952). The Central management argued that, without prior commission ap-
proval, an acquisition of Central control by Alleghany would violate § 5(2). See Louis-
ville & J. Bridge & R.R., supra at 730-31.
8. In September 1954, after the ICC had issued a show-cause order to Alleghany
which contemplated cancellation of the 1945 carrier status order, Alleghany applied with
Central for permission to merge the Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge & Railroad Com-
pany into the "Big Four," a carrier controlled by Central. Alleghany, in addition, re-
quested continuation of its carrier status. The SEC intervened, requesting jurisdiction
over Alleghany, and suggested that the carrier status order of 1945 should no longer be
in effect. I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 18656, Sept. 24, 1954. The petition to intervene of Bres-
wick & Co., a common stockholder of Alleghany, was denied. I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 18656,
Feb. 15, 1955. On March 2, 1955, Division Four of the ICC cancelled the 1945 status
order, found that Central was controlled by Alleghany, approved the merger of Jefferson-
ville into the Big Four, recognized Alleghany's control of Jeffersonville through the
agency of Central and held that Alleghany was to be "considered as a carrier" subject
to the provisions of § 20a. Louisville & J. Bridge & R.R., supra note 7, at 747. On recon-
sideration, the full Commission granted both the petitions of the SEC and Breswick to
intervene but denied a hearing. It approved the report of Division Four but differed on
the interpretation of § 5(2), requiring a noncarrier to obtain ICC approval prior to
acquiring more than one carrier. See note 7 supra. It stated that acquisition of control
of an integrated rail system was not the acquisition of more than one carrier within the
meaning of the act and thus not a transaction requiring its approval. Louisville & 3.
Bridge & R.R., 295 I.C.C. 11 (1955).
9. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 5(3) (1952) : "Whenever a person
which is not a carrier is authorized, by an order entered under paragraph (2) . . . , to
acquire control of any carrier or of two or more carriers, such person thereafter shall, to
the extent provided by the Commission in such order, be considered as a carrier subject to
such of the following provisions as are applicable to any carrier involved in such acquisi-
tion of control: . . . sections 20a(2) to (11), inclusiv&. . . . In the application of such
provisions of section 20a . . . the Commission shall authorize the issue or assumption
applied for only if it finds that such issue or assumption is consistent with the proper
performance of its service to the public by each carrier which is under the control of
such person, that it will not impair the ability of any such carrier to perform such service,
and that it is otherwise consistent with the public interest."
When a noncarrier investment company acquires carrier status, it is no longer subject
to the Investment Company Act. 54 STAT. 799 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c) (9) (1952).
The SEC, in intervening to request jurisdiction over Alleghany, claimed that congressional
policy would best be effected if the ICC revoked its 1945 status order. It viewed Alle-
ghany as primarily engaged in the business of investing, reinvesting or trading in securi-
ties and felt that, notwithstanding the alleged control of Central, public investors required
the protections of the Investment Company Act. Memorandum of the SEC, I.C.C. Fin.
Doc. No. 14692, Sept. 14, 1954; Transcript of Record, p. 191, Alleghany Corp. v. Bres-
wick & Co., 353 U.S. 151. (1957) (hereinafter cited as Record).
(Vol. 67
NOTES
Securities and Exchange Commission accordingly had exclusive jurisdiction
over the offering.' ° The court, overruling the ICC interpretation, construed
10. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). Alleghany
proposed to issue 1,367,440 shares of 6% convertible preferred stock in exchange for its
outstanding shares of 53% preferred stock and 14,768,352 shares of common stock upon
conversion of the convertible preferred. For a detailed discussion of the offering, see
Alleghany Corp., I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 18866, May 26, 1955, Record, p. 518. Breswick
attacked the issue both in the courts and before the Commission. A brief history of the
proceedings follows:
February 8, 1955--Proposed exchange approved at special meeting of Alleghany share-
holders. Record, p. 520.
February 18, 1955-Alleghany applies to ICC seeking a § 20a authorization. Record, p. 371.
March 2, 1955-Division Four grants Alleghany carrier status. Louisville & J. Bridge
& R.R., 290 I.C.C. 725 (1955).
March 28, 1955-Randolph Phillips, a holder of Alleghany common stock, files petition
for leave to intervene before the ICC and asserts lack of commission jurisdiction over,
and unfairness of, the issue. Record, p. 478.
April 6, 1955-Breswick & Co. denied injunction by district court, and directed first to
exhaust its administrative remedies before the ICC. Breswick & Co. v. Briggs, 130 F.
Supp. 953 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
April 11, 1955--Breswick files amended petition to intervene before the ICC. Record,
p. 489.
April 20, 1955-Breswick and Phillips permitted to intervene, but no hearing assigned.
Record, p. 508.
May 24, 1955-Full Commission affirms Division Four's order granting Alleghany carrier
status. Louisville & J. Bridge & R.R., 295 I.C.C. 1.1 (1955).
May 26, 1955-Division Four approves the stock issue. I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 18866, May
26, 1955, Record, p. 518.
June 22, 1955--Full Commission denies reconsideration of order authorizing stock issue.
Order effective immediately. Alleghany Corporation, I.C.C. Fin. Doc. No. 18866, June
22, 1955, Record, p. 554.
June 23, 1955-Alleghany begins to carry out the exchange. District Judge Dimock issues
temporary restraining order after 900,000 shares issued. Record, p. 56.
July 13, 1955-Breswick amends complaint filed in district court on June 6, 1955, contest-
ing status order, to include attack on ICC stock authorization orders of May 26 and June
22. Record, p. 94.
July 21, 1955-Preliminary injunction granted by three-judge court, Hincks,'C.J., dissent-
ing. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
August 3, 1955-Circuit Justice Harlan stays injunction as to the 900,000 shares already
issued. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 75 Sup. Ct. 912 (1955). Trading, however,
suspended on the New York Stock Exchange. See Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353
U.S. 151, 159 n.4 (1957).
November 18, 1955-Injunction made permanent. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138
F. Supp. 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
November 30, 1956-After Alleghany had registered with the SEC, reserving the right
to continue litigation, the SEC denies Alleghany application for stock approval under the
Investment Company Act. Alleghany Corp., 1952-56 CCH FED. Szc. L. R.P. f 76418
(SEC 1956).
The Commission's orders are subject to review by specially constituted three-judge
district courts. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2284, 2325 (1952). Appeals from these courts may be taken
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section 5 (2), requiring ICC approval prior to noncarrier acquisition of con-
trol over two or more carriers, as applying to the acquisition of a single rail-
way system." It held that such approval was prerequisite to ICC jurisdiction
and that neither de facto control of a system nor the approved merger of
another carrier into the system sufficed.' 2 On direct appeal, the Supreme
Court found that Alleghany's control over the Central system and Central's
approved control of another carrier supported commission jurisdiction. It
declined, however, to resolve the conflict over the interpretation of section
5 (2) and remanded for consideration of claims that the stock issue violated
the provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act.13
directly to the Supreme Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1952) ; see text at note 13 infra; cf.
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 233 (1938) : "In the opinion of Congress jurisdiction
with the extraordinary features of the Urgent Deficiencies Act was justified by the char-
acter of the cases to which it applied-cases of public importance because of the wide-
spread effect of the decisions thereof." See also DAvis, op. cit. supra note 4, at 725. For a
criticism of this method of reviewing agency determinations, see Developments in the
Law-Remedies Against the United States and Its Officials, 70 HARv. L. REv. 827, 902-03
(1957).
11. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 123, 137-38 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
See also Breswick & Co. v. United States, 134 F. Supp. 132 (S.D.N.Y. 1955) (granting
preliminary injunction). For text of § 5(2), see note 7 supra. The full Commission had
viewed the acquisition of an integrated railroad system as a transaction not within the
scope of § 5(2) and thus not requiring ICC approval. It argued that the concern of
§ 5(2) was with .the unification of carriers under common control and' management,
rather than shifts in the identity of the controller in no manner effecting carrier con-
solidation. Louisville & J. Bridge & R.R., 295 I.C.C. 11 (1955). Division Four, on the
other hand, had contended that, in accordance with past commission practice, control of
a single system might not lawfully be acquired without prior ICC approval. Louisville
& J. Bridge & R.R., 290 I.C.C. 725, 733 (1955). The district court noted that where an
agency is inconsistent in its statutory interpretation, courts give little or no weight to
the determination. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 138 F. Supp. 123, 128 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
12. Id. at 128, 135. The court reasoned that the Commission could not subject Alle-
ghany to its jurisdiction for the purposes of stock issuance without first approving Alle-
ghany's alleged control of Central. Thus, while the court questioned the existence of that
control, it felt that even were control present, the absence of the necessary ICC appro-
bation was sufficient ground to deny Alleghany carrier status. Ibid. Furthermore, Alle-
ghany control over Central assumed, the Jeffersonville merger was not thought to con-
stitute an "acquisition of control" within the meaning of § 5(2); hence the ICC order
authorizing the acquisition was a nullity. Since the 1955 carrier status order was thus
invalid, and the 1945 status order had been expressly terminated, see note 8 supra, the
court concluded that Alleghany was subject to SEC regulation under the Investment Com-
pany Act. For a discussion of the problem of the jurisdictional conflict between the ICC
and the SEC, see Comment, Regulation of Railroad Holding Companies Under the In-
vestment Company Act: The Alleghany Case, 6 DUKE B.J. 1 (1956).
13. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957). The Court first held
that Breswick had standing to attack the status order, since if it was invalid the ICC
would not possess jurisdiction to approve the stock issue alleged to be unfair. Id. at 159-
60. It then examined the control relationships between Alleghany and Central, and Central
and Jeffersonville, and found that Alleghany did in fact control Central, and, through
that control, Jeffersonville. Id. at 165, 171. The acquisition of Jeffersonville was held a
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Although finding these claims without merit, the district court continued
the injunction.' 4 Adhering to its interpretation that prior ICC approval was
essential to lawful acquisition of a system, the court deemed Alleghany illegal-
ly in control of Central.'1 Moreover, though Breswick had failed to raise the
point, it held that the stock authorization should await either approval of
control, to eliminate the possibility of divestiture,1 6 or a specific commission
finding that, despite this danger, immediate issuance would be in the public
interest.' 7 Nevertheless, perhaps in view of the ICC's position that no ap-
transaction within the scope of § 5(2). Id. at 171. Thus, since Alleghany controlled more
than one carrier, the status order was justified, and the ICC had the power to rule on
the stock issue. The necessity of approved control of Central was held irrelevant to the
Commission's jurisdiction. "The Commission and Alleghany contend that Commission
approval of the acquisition of a single, integrated system is not necessary. We need not
decide this question, however, and intimate no opinion on it, for even if such approval is
necessary, the statutory requirement of 'a person which is not a carrier and which has
control of one or more carriers' refers to 'control' and not to 'approved control.' There
seems to be no reason to read in the word 'approved.' Such a holding would mean that
the failure of a company engaged in a transaction requiring Commission approval to
apply for that approval would deprive the Commission of jurisdiction." Id. at 161-62.
Thus, while de facto control of Central was determined to be in Alleghany, the legality
of that control was not decided. The case was remanded for "consideration by the Dis-
trict Court of appellees' claim, not previously discussed, that the preferred stock issue
as approved by the Commission was in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act." Id.
at 175.
14. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Claiming
that the proposed offering was unfair to common stockholders and that the Commission's
findings on that point were inadequate, Breswick argued that the value of the old pre-
ferred was overestimated, the new preferred underestimated. Conversion of the new pre-
ferred, then, would operate to dilute the common stock. Brief for Plaintiffs, ibid. The dis-
trict court held the Commission's findings adequate, and disposition of these claims to be
within the range of the agency's expert judgment. Id. at 230. It also rejected Breswick's
contention that dissenting shareholders were entitled to an evidentiary hearing before the
Commission. Ibid.
15. Id. at 232, 233. Alleghany's control of Central was deemed to violate § 5(4) of
the Interstate Commerce Act as a matter of law. The section provides that the effecting
of "the control or management in a common interest of any two or more carriers" in any
way other than as provided by § 5(2) shall be unlawful. 41 STAT. 481 (1920), as amended,
49 U.S.C. § 5(4) (1952). The court reiterated its view that control of a system requires
prior commission approval, for it interpreted a system as consisting of more than one
carrier within the meaning of § 5(2).
16. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 227, 235 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Bres-
wick had not argued the relevance of divestment possibilities, resulting from unlawful
carrier control, before the Commission, see note 17 infra, nor briefed the point on remand
to the district court, Brief for Plaintiffs, Breswick & Co. v. United States, supra.
17. Breswick & Co. v. United States, supra note 16, at 235. "As long as Alleghany's
control of Central is unapproved, it is subject to injunction, divestiture and other sanc-
tions. ... To say the least, it would be arbitrary to authorize the issue without even con-
sidering the effect of divestiture upon the value of this important asset as long as that
action remains a possibility." Id. at 233, 234. The court reasoned that protection of poten-
tial investors in the new preferred barred issuance until this "cloud" upon the stock's value
was lifted. Id. at 233. However, since the proposed issue was not designed for new in-
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proval was necessary under section 5(2), the court did not remand for com-
mission action.' 8  On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed, and, in a per
curiam opinion, remanded in language identical to that of its original man-
date.19
The summary reversal implied that the district court exceeded the bounds
of the previous remand in re-emphasizing Alleghany's unapproved control of
Central. It did not specify, however, whether the remand was violated be-
cause illegal control could not be argued initially in the district court, 20 be-
vestors but existing shareholders, see note 10 supra, who would be equally injured by
divestiture whether they held new or old certificates, the protection envisioned by the dis-
trict court appears illusory.
The injunction, furthermore, was held necessary to protect the interests of the con-
sumer. The court argued that since the possibility of divestment was not considered by
the Commission in approving the stock, the. § 20a findings were necessarily inadequate.
The authorization would, in view of the illegal control, conflict with the ICC's settled
policy of compelling prompt application for approval of control where required. Breswick
& Co. v. United States, supra note 16, at 235. Moreover, the granting of stock authoriza-
tions prior to approving control resulted in arbitrary and capricious agency action, and
such "piecemeal" authorizations would preclude, as a practical matter, divestiture in the
future. Id. at 236, 237. But see note 33 infra for cases where the ICC disposed of out-
standing violations of § 5 (2) before proceeding to other regulatory determinations.
18. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 227, 237 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Under
the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2321-25 (1952), a three-judge court is limited
in relief to setting aside or enjoining the ICC's order and remanding the cause for further
consideration. See United States v. Jones, 336 U.S. 641, 672-73 (1949).
19. Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 26 U.S.L. WEE 4116 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1958):
"[T]he case is remanded for consideration . . . of the only claim that was left open at
this Court's prior disposition of this litigation, to wit, whether 'the preferred stock issue
as approved by the (Interstate Commerce) Commission was in violation of the Inter-
state Commerce Act."
Three Justices dissented, viewing the district court's ruling as within the scope of the
previous remand. Mr. Justice Douglas, the spokesman, stated: "No one . . . should be
confused by the fact this Court held approval of the acquisition was not necessary under
the facts of this case for one reason (jurisdiction) and the District Court held approval
was necessary for another reason (compliance with the Act before the stock could be
issued)." Id. at 4118. In particular, the minority objected to the "broken-field running"
characterizing the procedure permitted Alleghany by the Commission. Id. at 4119. The
phrase indicates the minority had accepted the district court's interpretation of "system"
and viewed discussion of that point appropriate.
The recent dismissal of the injunction by the district court terminated the litigation.
See N.Y. Times, March 28, 1958, p. 37, col. 4. The court reaffirmed its view that the
stock issue complied with the Commerce Act's requirements. See note 14 supra.
20. Breswick had failed to raise the threat of divestiture as a bar to issuance. See
note 16 supra. Judicial review of agency action is limited to allegations of error made
before the agency in the first instance. See United States v. Tucker Truck Lines, 344
U.S. 33 (1952) (objection to ICC procedure first raised in three-judge district court
may not be considered by that court); Carolina Scenic Coach Lines v. United States,
56 F. Supp. 801, 804 (D.N.C.), aff'd, 323 U.S. 678 (1944) (objection to ICC grant of
certificate of convenience and necessity raised initially before three-judge court not judi-
cially cognizable) (dictum) ; Colorado Radio Corp. v. FCC, 118 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1941)
(party cannot object that Commission failed to consider a factor which was not pre-
[Vol. 67
NOTES
cause that court had improperly raised the issue on its own motion 21 or
because prior approval was not necessary to the stock authorization.2 2 The
decision thus fails to establish the procedure to be followed in similar cases
and invites relitigation of the issues in Alleghany.23
The Court's silence also leaves unanswered the district court's arguments
that approval of control is essential to investor and consumer protection from
a subsequent stock issue.2 4 Undoubtedly, the elimination of divestment possi-
bilities affords shareholders a more secure investment.2 5 Further, where con-
trol must be approved, a judicial requirement that approval precede authori-
zation of an issue would force carriers to seek a determination of the desira-
bility of continued control, thus countering possible ICC laxity in investigat-
ing illegal acquisitions.2 6 Finally, linking section 5(2) to section 20a may
sented to agency prior to decision). See also Hutchinson v. Fidelity Inv. Ass'n, 106 F.2d
431, 436 (4th Cir. 1939): "An appellate court . . . cannot assume the functions of a
special master and roam at large over the record, and any attempt ...to do so would
probably do a great deal more harm than good."
21. Not only had the ICC, the tribunal of the first instance, no opportunity to
formulate a reply to the argument that divestment threats constitute a bar to stock
issuance, but the litigant Alleghany was similarly unaware and thus unprepared. Cf.
United States v. Hancock Truck Lines, 324 U.S. 774, 779 (1945) (reviewing court could
not reverse ICC order on ground urged before Commission but waived for purposes of
appeal) ; 3 Am. JuR., Appeal and Error § 812 (1936) (no search will be made by a court
for additional grounds for reversal).
22. Such a holding would, of course, have disposed of the merits of the case.
23. For example, where a carrier clearly subject to the Commission's jurisdiction
attempts a stock issuance, the right of a stockholder to allege a previous acquisition of
carrier control, unapproved by the ICC, as a ground for denying authorization remains
in question. Alleghany itself is currently requesting approval for a new security issu-
ance. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1958, p. 20, col. 1. The same objections could con-
ceivably be made to this offering as were made to that in the principal case.
24. See note 17 supra. The district court distinguished the harm threatening the
potential investors in Alleghany's new preferred stock from that facing the general pub-
lic. In the absence of explicit rationalization for ignoring the control question in a § 20a
proceeding, the court felt that the ICC's action would be capricious and arbitrary. Bres-
wick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 227 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). A court may properly
set aside an agency order held capricious. Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R., 305 U.S.
177, 185 (1938); cf. Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United States, 292 U.S. 282,
286-87 (1934).
25. Divestiture is recognized as a harsh procedure. See note 29 infra. In its potential
effects on the value of stock, it is analogous to imminent loss of a substantial lawsuit.
The Securities and Exchange Commission has seen the need for investor awareness of
pending litigation and has required issuers so to inform the investing public. See note
38 infra. If the expected loss is considerable, existing shareholders may deem it advis-
able to sell, and potential shareholders to refrain from purchasing. See, generally,
GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR (1954).
26. For criticism of the operations of the Commission, see Huntington, The Marasmus
of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467
(1952). But see Morgan, A Critique of "The Marasmnus of the ICC: The Commission,
the Railroads, and the Public Interest," 62 YALE L.J. 171 (1953). See also Huntington,
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facilitate review of a commission determination that a given shift in control
lay beyond the compass of section 5(2) .27
Rejection of stock offerings, however, is not an effective method of pro-
moting these ends. Unless objection is made to the security issue, opportuni-
ty for judicial examination of the existence or propriety of control is not
increased. 28 And imposition of an approval of control requirement could re-
Morgan & Williams, The ICC Re-examined: A Colloquy, 63 YALE L.J. 44 (1953). For
cases where examination of control relationships was delayed, see note 33 infra.
A carrier, contemplating future issuance of stock and fearing objection to the issue
on the ground of illegal acquisition of another carrier, would find it advisable immediately
to request approval of control in order to avoid the expense and delay of litigation which
occurred in Alleghany. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1958, p. 1, col. 5; id. p. 37, cols. 5, 6. In
Alleghany, however, a request for approval would have been useless, since the Commis-
sion deemed approval unnecessary as a matter of law. See note 8 supra.
27. A supplementary method for reviewing § 5(2) errors might thus be furnished.
For the usual way such errors are presented to the courts, see note 28 infra; cases cited
note 41 infra.
28. ICC stock authorizations are not subject to judicial review unless a party with
standing appeals to a three-judge court. Shareholders may claim unfairness of an issue,
but if the Commission's order has a rational basis, and the potential injury to the share-
holders' legal rights is questionable, the determination is unassailable. For cases indicat-
ing the strict requirements to obtain standing to attack ICC orders in the courts, see
Moffat Tunnel League v. United States, 289 U.S. 113 (1933) (appellant had no legal
"personality" and thus no rights to contest § 5(2) determinations) ; Alexander Sprunt
& Son v. United States, 281. U.S. 249 (1930) (shipper lacked standing to attack ICC
order removing rate differential, since no independent legal right violated by the order) ;
Edward Hines Trustees v. United States, 263 U.S. 143 (1923) (shipper had no right
to require carriers to impose penalty charges in the absence of a showing of any legal
injury, actual or threatened). See also Mississippi Valley Barge Line Co. v. United
States, 292 U.S. 282 (1934) (judicial function exhausted when rational basis found for
agency's conclusions); Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625, 648 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (in
separate stockholder suit where breach of fiduciary duty is claimed, ICC § 20a order of
disapproval should not have res judicata effect; otherwise, Commission would face ex-
cessive and spurious objections in § 20a proceedings by intervening stockholders).
Section 20a would appear intentionally to discourage attacks on ICC stock authoriza-
tions. "The jurisdiction conferred upon the commission by this section shall be exclusive
and plenary, and a carrier may issue securities and assume obligations or liabilities in
accordance with the provisions of this section without securing approval other than as
specified herein." 41 STAT. 495 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 20a(7) (1952). "[N]o security
issued or obligation or liability assumed in accordance with all the terms and conditions
of . . . an order of authorization . . . shall be rendered void because of failure to comply
with any provision of this section relating to piocedure and other matters preceding the
entry of such order of authorization." 41 STAT. 496 (1920), 49 U.S.C. § 20a(ll) (1952).
See note 32 in-fra, discussing the reliance on the ICC, not private interests, to implement
the aims of carrier regulation.
ICC control determinations may be attacked independently of § 20a proceedings. See
The Chicago Junction Case, 264 U.S. 258 (1924) (competitor allowed standing to object
to commission approval of carrier control acquisition); cf. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry
Co. v. United States, 285 U.S. 382 (1932) (competitor has standing to object to exten-
sion of railroad line) ; Western Pac. Cal. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co., 284 U.S. 47 (1931)
(same; definite legal right seriously threatened). And investors, too, may contest § 5(2)
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strict rather than enhance the likelihood of challenge. Dissenting shareholders,
the usual protestants in section 20a proceedings, may fear injury from dives-
titure and be hesitant to attack control.29 Were courts to raise the issue on
their own motion, similar fear could deter stockholders from registering any
protest.30 Again, rejection of offerings seems an undesirable means of coun-
determinations, but only when an independent legal right is threatened. See New York
Cent. Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932) (minority stockholder cor-
poration has standing to contest ICC order authorizing rental dividend payments by
lessee carrier in connection with control modification, since its alleged injury was not
derivative but independent) ; Stott v. United States, 154 F. Supp. 389, 390-91 (SD.N.Y.
1957) (minority shareholders have standing to object to § 5(2) determinations when
exchange of stock occasioned by carrier merger threatens injury; dictum) ; Pittsburgh
& W. Va. Ry. v. United States, 281 U.S. 479, 487 (,1930) (stockholder may have stand-
ing to object in some cases of acquisition of control and consolidation; dictum).
Generally, the statutory provisions of the Commerce Act furnish little assistance in
determining standing questions. See Davis, Standing to Challenge and to Enforce Ad-
ministrative Action, 49 COLUm. L. REV. 759, 772 (1949).
29. The district court, though not specifying the harm divestiture might cause exist-
ing or potential shareholders, clearly indicated a belief that the dangers were significant
by its ruling barring issuance. Breswick & Co. v. United States, 156 F. Supp. 227, 233-
34 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). The possible adverse effects of divestiture on shareholders of the
divesting corporation have been noted by the courts. See Louisiana Pub. Serv. Comn'n
v. SEC, 235 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 368 (1957) (recognition of the
possible sizable, if not substantial, loss to the divesting company through an order of
divestiture). In Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), the
Court affirmed the decision of the district court finding a violation of the Sherman Act
but reversed a divestiture order. Three members of the majority defended divestiture as
within the lower court's discretion. Id. at 601. Two members of the Court concurred in
finding antitrust violations but stated that "since divestiture is a remedy to restore com-
petition and not to punish those who restrain trade, it is not to be used indiscriminately,
without regard to the type of violation or whether other effective methods, less harsh,
are available." Id. at 603. Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, adopted the arguments
of the concurrence concerning divestiture to support his own contention that no Sherman
Act violation had occurred. Id. at 605. When divestment is ordered, courts may delay
enforcement to reduce the injury to the corporation. See HAMILTON & TILL, INVESTIGA-
TION OF CONCENTRATION OF ECONOMI C PowER 97 (TNEC Monograph No. 16, 1941). But
cf. REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 356 (1955) (divestiture has not proved to be a harsh or onerous burden on
property).
The remedy of divestiture, as applied by the ICC, would affect carriers with like
severity. And the threat of divestment would appear to reduce the attractiveness, and
consequently the market value, of a carrier's securities. The danger of divestiture to
existing shareholders is clearly no less than that to potential shareholders. The Com-
mission has ordered divestiture in Robert J. Gisinger, 60 MC.C. 321 (1954) ; Transcon-
tinental Bus System, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 323 (1951); Pacific Greyhound Lines, 56 M.C.C.
415 (1950); see George J. Kolowich, 58 M.C.C. 599 (1952); Thomas M. Mooney, 56
M.C.C. 771 (1950).
30. A court may treat a protesting stockholder as a representative of the public, as
well as his own, interest. Where objection is made to a particular stock offering, it
could, in the public interest, introduce the possibility of divestiture and thus jeopardize
the value of the asset held by the issuing corporation to the detriment of the stockholder.
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tering administrative laxity in the investigation of shifts in control. Commis-
sion failure to investigate immediately may be caused by budgetary limita-
tions.31 The expedient of examining promptly only those acquisitions thought
to threaten injury to the public would be defeated by court decisions com-
pelling indiscriminate scrutiny of all suspect transactions. 32 Moreover, the
Commission in its own discretion has generally examined previously un-
approved control before granting other regulatory authorizations.3 3 Thus, the
major effect of the district court's decision might not be to encourage earlier
commission action but to penalize carriers whose acquisitions the ICC has not
deemed to require section 5 (2) approval,34 or to induce them to demand in-
See note 29 supra. Such a reduction in value may have considerable effect on the stock-
holder's desire to question stock offerings.
Attacks on corporate security issuances by minority shareholders are viewed with
disfavor. See Hornstein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future,
41 CoLum. L. REv. 405 (1941) ; Pound, Visitatorial Jurisdiction Over Corporations in
Equity, 49 HARv. L. REv. 369, 395 (1936). On derivative suits generally, see BALLAN-
TINE, CORPORATIONS 333-74 (rev. ed. 1946). If minority actions are to be discouraged,
however, a rational method of attaining this end would apply to all such actions, rather
than selected cases.
31. The vigorous criticism to which the Commission has been subjected in recent
years, see note 26 supra, has been met with assertions of inadequate funds and personnel,
see Survey of Organization and Operations of the Interstate Commerce Commission,
20 ICC PRAc. J. 358, 370, 389 (1953) (recommending added personnel) ; Arpaia, Criticism
of the Commission and Its Work, 20 ICC PRAC. J. 203, 207-0 (1953) (deterioration of
personnel status of Commission in recent years due to budgetary limitations).
32. The Commission is given broad discretion in protecting the public interest in
carrier acquisitions. "Resolving these considerations [involved in carrier consolidations]
is a complex task which requires extensive facilities, expert judgment and considerable
knowledge of the transportation industry. Congress left that task to the Commission...."
McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321. U.S. 67, 87 (1944). Cf. BONERIGHT, RAIL-
ROAD CAPITALIzATION 153 (1920) (the Transportation Act of 1920 gives "to the regulat-
ing commission the widest discretionary powers instead of making specific rules on which
decisions must be based"). See also note 48 infra.
33. See cases cited note 29 supra, where the Commission required divestiture.
Alternatively, it may authorize continuation of originally unapproved control in the pub-
lic interest. See, e.g., M. J. Baggett, 11 Fed. Carr. Cas. ff 33393 (ICC 1955) ; H. M.
O'Neill, 60 M.C.C. 404 (1954) ; Ernest Capitani, 57 M.C.C. 413 (1951) ; Potomac Coach
Lines, Inc., 57 M.C.C. 199, 207 (1950) ; J. Newton Rayzor, 58 M.C.C. 439, 459 (1952) :
"Should we deny the application because of the law violation [acquisition without ap-
proval], which has now continued for nearly 3 years, and order a divestiture, in all
probability a substantial period would elapse before divestiture could be effected, and in
all likelihood there would be a severe deterioration in the services ... for which there
is a continuing and urgent need. Regardless of the law violation, the public interest is
paramount."
34. The Supreme Court enunciated the criteria for determining whether a shift in
control necessitated commission approval in the first Alleghany case. "The crux of each
inquiry to determine whether there has been an 'acquisition of control' is the nature of
the change in relations between the companies whose proposed transaction is before the
Commission for approval. Does the transaction accomplish a significant increase in the
power of one over the other, for example, an increased voice in management or operation,
or the ability to accomplish financial transactions or operational changes with greater
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dications that control would have been approved had such action been con-
sidered necessary. 35 Such demands by parties fearing subsequent attack on
stock offerings would, especially if insignificant control modifications were
involved, severely tax ICC operations and perhaps give rise to hasty de-
cisions.36
Furthermore, approval of control prior to stock authorization is not neces-
sary to safeguard investors. The degree of protection afforded by the Inter-
state Commerce Act need be no greater than that of the Securities Act, which
protects purchasers by insuring disclosure of all facts essential to informed
investor judgment.37 When the financial structure of the issuing corporation
legal ease? This is the issue .... " Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151,
169 (1957). See also United States v. Marshall Transp. Co., 322 U.S. 31 (1944) (non-
carrier, by use of subsidiaries, gaining control over other carriers is subject to ICC juris-
diction). Despite the efforts of the Court to demarcate the bounds of "acquisition of
control," the reach of § 5(2) remains uncertain. For cases where the Commission found
its approval to be unnecessary, see Great Southern Coaches, Inc., 60 M.C.C. 661 (1954)
(not established that applicant is a carrier within the meaning of § 5) ; Ithaca Transp.
Serv., Inc., 65 Mf.C.C. 5 (1955) (where vendor is not a carrier, purchaser did not obtain
carrier status; application for control approval dismissed) ; Universal Carloading & Dis-
tributing Co., 1 Fed. Carr. Cas. ff 7490 (ICC 1940) (applicant not a carrier as defined
in the act) ; Acme Fast Freight, Inc., 8 M.C.C. 211 (1938) (same) ; Greyhound Mergers,
1 M.C.C. 342, 351 (1936) (change in form rather than substance does not require ICC
approval).
35. Requests for rulings on contingencies by carriers suspecting future interferetce
with financing transactions are likely to be viewed with disfavor by an agency generally
quick to safeguard its independence from the judiciary. See Arpaia, The Independent
Agency-A Neccssary Instrument of Democratic Government, 69 HARv. L. REv. 483
(1956). However, the ICC might not sacrifice the carrier's need for certainty to its own
philosophy of regulation. Cf. Louisiana Ry. & Nay. Co., 99 I.C.C. 357, 358 (1925) (cau-
tioning that certain types of ICC decisions shall not be taken as precedents) ; INTRSTATE
CoMMCmcE CoMaMSSI N AcTirVins, 1887-1937, 167 (1937).
36. Carriers contemplating stock issues would desire to avoid the delay resulting
from the investigation and resolution of § 5(2) questions in a § 20a proceeding. Thus,
disposition of even the most insignificant control modifications might appear advisable.
The concomitant increase in commission activity would probably yield general decreased
operational efficiency. Cf. Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 70, 77 (1949): "If granting review
to a petitioner will open the way for a flood of appeals resulting in hamstringing effective
administration of the Act and overloading the court dockets, the court will be reluctant
to grant it." Moreover, the demands upon the Commission may be for immediate
approval and thus aggravate the investigative burden. See note 31 supra.
37. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952) ; see note 4 supra.
For an analysis of the philosophy of disclosure pervading the Securities Act, see Loss,
SECURiTiEs REGULATION 77-82 (1951). Corporations subject to SEC regulation as in-
vestment companies are not exempt from the requirements of the Securities Act. See
Motley, Jackson & Barnard, supra note 4, at 1136. Registration under the Investment
Company Act is largely an adaptation of the Securities Act's provisions for disclosure,
and the remainder of the Investment Company Act's substantive sections consist of
statutory prohibitions against issuance in specific cases. In this area, SEC discretion is
primarily limited to granting exemptions from the requirements of the act. Id. at 1,147.
However, carriers and investment companies attaining carrier status are exempted from
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is threatened, the authority of the SEC, administering the Securities Act, is
limited to giving purchasers notice of the danger inherent in the offering.38
It is so restricted even when the corporation faces possible loss of a major
suit, a danger which may be substantially greater than the threat of an ICC
divestment order.3 9 Thus, if the possibility of divestiture is disclosed, investor
interests should be sufficiently safeguarded. 40 Existing shareholders contest-
both SEC Investment Company and Securities Act regulation. See 41 STAT. 495 (1920),
49 U.S.C. § 20a(7) (1952) ; Loss, op. cit. supra at 72. See also note 9 supra.
While arguments have been made that the investor protection afforded by the Inter-
state Commerce Act should be no less than that given by the Investment Company and
Securities Acts, greater safeguards have never been advocated. See Brief for Appellees,
p. 27, Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151 (1957). And neither the Securi-
ties Act nor the Investment Company Act gives the SEC power to refuse authorizations
to stock offerings because a threat of divestiture exists. See 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952); 54 STAT. 789 (1940), as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 80a-1 to -52 (1952). Under current standards of investor protection, elimination of
divestiture possibilities would, therefore, not appear prerequisite to stock authorizations.
Significantly, in the Alleghany litigation, when SEC jurisdiction under the Investment
Company Act was assumed, see note 10 supra, neither the SEC staff approving the stock
nor the full SEC rejecting it mentioned the lack of approved control and the dangers
of divestment, see Alleghany Corp., 1952-56 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 76418 (SEC 1956).
38. 48 STAT. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1952). For a vivid
example of the limited authority of the SEC in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation,
see Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947). The SEC was convinced of the proposed stock's
insecure nature and, as a warning to investors, expounded on its speculative aspects.
However, since the issuer fulfilled the statutory obligations of disclosure, the stock was
released to the public, the SEC emphasizing that it was "in no way passing on the merit
or lack of merit of the securities offered . . . ." Id. at 263; cf. Sec. Act Rel. 1, 1 CCH
FED. SEC. L. RP'. 11 2451.01 (1933). See also Livingston Mining Co., 2 S.E.C. 141 (1937)
(corporation must disclose information about pending litigation which may affect rights
in firm's assets) ; Thomascolor, Inc., 27 S.E.C. 151, 155 (1947) ("urging" prospective
investors to study carefully the amended prospectus) ; Consolidated Funds Corp., 2 S.E.C.
724 (1937) (same).
39. Astronomical sums may be claimed as damages in pending civil litigation. See
Columbia Gas & Elec. Corp., 3 S.E.C. 313, 320 (1938) (request under the Holding Com-
pany Act, which subjects the issuing corporation to more stringent regulation than the
Securities Act, see Loss, SECUalTIEs REGULATION 85-94 (1951), to pay dividends on
common stock) : "In addition to routine rate and other litigation, there is now pending
against applicant and some of its subsidiary companies certain extraordinary litigation,
in which large amounts, aggregating approximately $88,000,000 are demanded. Naturally
the Commission is in no position to express any opinion as to the merits of this litigation,
nor does it desire to do so." The loss of such suits would surely upset the financial struc-
ture of the issuer. But unlike the loss of civil litigation, divestiture involves at least a
partial return of capital. For the threat entailed in divestiture, see note 29 supra.
40. Applied to the Alleghany litigation, this principle would peTmit the stock to issue.
For the investor need only be made aware of dangers which exist at the time of issu-
ance. The possibility of divestiture as a cloud upon the value of the proposed preferred
stock was of no significance until the district court's ruling cast doubt on the ICC
interpretation of § 5(2). See note 11 supra. The threat is thus analogous to that arising
out of a change in law potentially giving parties a civil claim against the issuing cor-
poration. Of course, if the Commission had been aware, when it approved the stock, that
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ing the fairness of an offering must, of course, have access to the courts for
equitable relief.4 1 But allegations of divestment possibilities provide no basis
for claims of unfairness, particularly where authority to divest is denied by
the agency approving the stock issue.42
Thus promoting neither aspect of the dual function of the ICC-protection
of the consuming public and investors-a prior approval of control require-
ment also occasions an undesirable distortion of the judicial process. Con-
sideration in stock authorization proceedings of the necessity for ICC approval
of prior shifts in control entails judicial resolution of complicated legal ques-
tions without benefit of argument by suitable parties.43 Such determinations
are particularly undesirable when made, in cases like Alleghany, by the same
tribunal which would review a section 5(2) proceeding directly: the finding
is not only binding precedent, it may preclude those with standing to raise the
issue from doing so. 44 Admittedly, rejecting review of section 5(2) deter-
it possessed the authority to divest Alleghany of Central due to illegality of control, it
would have been negligent in not informing the public. Similarly, where a carrier pro-
posing to issue stock is involved in significant litigation, see note 39 supra, if the issuance
is authorized, the Commission should be required to disclose the nature and extent of
the litigation to the potential investor. This may be done in the commission order of
authorization. See DAvis, ADMINISTRATVE LAW 546 (1951) (ICC publishes reasoned
opinions which in all respects resemble ordinary judicial opinions); ICC, REPoRT 125
(1940) (settled policy of the ICC has favored the formulation of a detailed, reasoned
report of its actions).
41. See note 28 supra; Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151, 159-60
(1957) (preferred stock issue threatening financial injury to minority shareholders suffi-
cient to confer standing) ; cf. American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 325 U.S. 385 (1945)
(shareholder could challenge order of SEC requiring corporation to make a transfer
from surplus to capital account).
42. Whatever harm might result to shareholders from divestiture would not be
caused by an otherwise fair issuance of securities. In Alleghany, the alleged illegal con-
trol existed independently of the proposed stock issue, and the dangers of divestment to
existing shareholders were no greater or less because of it.
43. Under the Alleghany district court decision, any court affirmance of stock au-
thorization must be taken as a silent holding that existing unapproved control relation-
ships did not require approval under the statute. And if the danger of divestiture is suffi-
cient, objecting shareholders will either not argue the issue of control or, if requested to
by the court, will do so only perfunctorily. See note 30 supra. Furthermore, the ICC
itself, seeking a favorable forum for review of its legal opinions on the necessity for con-
trol approval, might raise the question and rely on the fear of divestment to dampen any
arguments of opposing stockholders. See note 29 supra. Significantly, the latter possi-
bility could arise under a narrow reading of the Supreme Court opinion as well as under
the district court's decision. See text at notes 20-22 supra. In all such cases, the court
would be forced to decide the statutory necessity of control approval, often an extremely
complex issue, see note 32 supra, without strong argument that approval was required.
For the potential effect of such decisions on those most interested in control determina-
tions, see note 44 infra.
44. Conceivably, the district court could have, in examining the control of Central,
concluded that ICC approval was not required under the act. See note 11 supra. Subse-
quently, despite the absence of a statute of limitations period, a competing carrier, shipper
or other party with potential standing to contest § 5(2) control determinations might
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minations in section 20a proceedings may effectively deny shareholders stand-
ing to argue the control question. 45 Deference to collateral rulings does not,
however, conclusively bar judicial review of commission findings but merely
forestalls it until the appropriate proceedings have been held.40 The Com-
mission's special concern and expertise in the control issue heightens the un-
desirability of earlier review by minimizing the possibility of error and hence
the advantages of review generally, as compared with cases in which the col-
lateral issue is normally first tried in the courts.47
have difficulty in objecting to illegality of control in a direct proceeding, since the court
would have already ruled on the contention collaterally.
45. In discussing reviewability at the suit of dissenting shareholders, the Supreme
Court stated that Breswick might attack the status order only as it conferred jurisdic-
tion on the ICC. See note 13 supra. The order did not, of itself, "pose any individualized
threat to the welfare of appellees." Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 353 U.S. 151,
174 (1957). The claimed "dilution," however, was sufficient to allow Breswick to sue.
The Court thus rejected the contention that the case of Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United
.States, 281 U.S. 479 (1930), governed the matter of standing. In Pittsburgh, a railway com-
pany proposed to sell its station and become a tenant in a new terminal. A minority stock-
holder railroad objected. The Supreme Court denied standing to contest the ICC order
of approval; it stated that the stockholder's financial interest, though substantial, did
not differ from that of every investor in the corporation's securities, "or from an in-
vestor's interest in any business transaction or lawsuit of his corporation .... The injury
feared [was] ... the indirect harm which may result to every stockholder from harm to
the corporation." Id. at 487. The district court in Alleghany, however, did not base the
injunction on an "individualized threat" to Breswick as a common stockholder but on
the general injury to which all Alleghany investors would be subject-financial loss
through an ICC order of divestment. Thus, the second district court opinion appears to
have violated the Pittsburgh rule and to have granted Breswick standing to request an
injunction on a theory considered and rejected in its first appearance before the Supreme
Court. Cf. Davis, supra note 28, at 772-77. But see dissent of Mr. Justice Douglas,
Alleghany Corp. v. Breswick & Co., 26 U.S.L. WEEK 4116, 4119 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1958),
note 19 supra.
For arguments in favor of increasing the parties with standing to contest agency
decisions, see Davis, supra note 28, at 791-95. But see L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac.
R.R., 311. U.S. 295 (1940) (inadvisable to allow any private interest to thrash out com-
plicated questions before the agency).
46. Competitors can challenge § 5(2) determinations in the courts. And shareholders
are not denied standing if they establish a threatened individualized injury. See notes 28,
41 supra. The court in Pittsburgh & W. Va. Ry. v. United States, supra note 45, at 487
n.8, while denying standing, recognized that dissenting shareholders may in some circum-
stances sue and collected ICC cases in which shareholders were allowed to intervene:
New York Cent., 72 I.C.C. 96 (1922) (preferred stockholders claiming price proposed
for their stock inadequate) ; Nickel Plate, 105 I.C.C. 425 (1926) (minority interests
not properly represented in merger); Cincinnati, I. & W.R.R., 124 I.C.C. 476 (1927)
(claim that fair share of benefits from proposed operational agreement denied minority
shareholders) ; Southwestern Lines, 124 I.C.C. 401 (1927) (application for carrier con-
trol by stock purchase denied, since inadequate provisions made for rights of minority
shareholders) ; Louisville, H. & St. L. Ry., 150 I.C.C. 741 (1929) (minority stockholders
objecting to rental terms of lease in which carrier control effected).
47. The Commission is the tribunal of the first instance in control determinations.
See Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182, 197 (1948) (jurisdiction of ICC under
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Judicial review of stock authorizations, accordingly, should not extend to
prior shifts in control. Premature review usurps the discretionary powers of
the agency to establish its own orderly procedure, based on its budgetary and
personnel limitations.48 If these limitations in fact cause the ICC to be negli-
gent in protecting the consumer from the dangers of illegal carrier acquisition,
prompt investigation should be spurred by Congress, as the major regulatory
force over administrative action, rather than compelled by the courts.49 Further-
more, since the investor is adequately protected by disclosure of the possible
dangers in an issue, a reviewing court's proper function is simply to insure
investor awareness of these dangers. Only when the ICC does not reveal
attacks on an offering in authorization proceedings or its own contemplated
future action testing carrier control should a court remand to the agency for
disclosure of the facts. Properly construed, then, the Supreme Court's man-
date justifiably precludes reversal of administrative regulatory determinations
for errors of law collateral to the proceedings. The holding refutes the the-
oretical merit in subordinating stock authorizations to control controversies
and offers adequate protection to both consumer and investor.
§ 5 is exclusive, plenary and independent of all other state or federal authority); cf.
Thompson v. Texas AT. Ry., 328 U.S. 134, 151 (1946) ; Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United
States, 307 U.S. 125, 138-39 (1939) : "This court 'ascribed' to the findings of the Commis-
sion [FCC] the 'strength due to the judgments of a tribunal appointed by law and in-
formed by experience' . . . . Recognition of the Commission's expertise also led this
court not to bind the Commission to common law evidentiary and procedural fetters in
enforcing basic procedural safeguards." On the ICC's expertise in determining control
issues, see note 32 supra.
48. See note 31 supra. See also 2 SHARFMAN, THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE CoM-
MISSION 480 (1931): "Since the primary objective [of Commission regulation] . . . is
the protection and furtherance of the public interest, which is subject neither to precise
definition as a general goal nor to automatic realization in concrete terms, the exercise
of discretion becomes the dominant factor both in the disposition of applications, under
the enabling powers, and in the adjudication of controversies under the directing powers."
"[Jfudicial review . . . has almost invariably served as a safeguard against the abuse
of administrative authority, and not as an independent source of authority in the courts
for molding the character and discretion of the regulatory process." 2 id. at 421.
49. In addition to increasing the Commission's appropriation, Congress might declare
carrier control acquired without prior ICC approval void and require divestiture if appli-
cation for approval is not made within a reasonable time. The only exception the Com-
mission might then grant would be in cases where approval of control had been sought
but refused as unnecessary under the statute. See note 34 supra. Further, substantial
fines might be imposed on the violator. Such remedies would, however, decrease the
important discretionary powers of the agency and, in arbitrarily compelling divestiture,
possibly cause considerable injury to public transportation service.
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